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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES E. GOOD and MARY G.
GOOD,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

DON M. CHRISTENSEN, DON M.
CHRISTENSEN CONSTRUCTION CO.,
CONSTRUCTION REALTY, LEWIS C.
HANSEN and BILLIE J. HANSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13659

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants brought suit in the District
Court for Salt Lake County alleging the negligent design
and construction of a multi-car carport which plaintiffs
alleged had been designed and constructed by Defendants Don M. Christensen, Don M. Christensen Construction Company, and Construction Realty, which was originally built for Defendants Lewis C. Hansen and Billie J.
Hansen, more than seven years previously.
DISPOSITION I N LOWER COURT
Defendants-Respondents moved for Summary Judgment alleging that the seven-year statute of limitations set
forth in Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Code Annotated
1
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(1973 Supp.) and the four-year statute of limitations set
forth in Section 78-12-25(2) of the Utah Code Annotated
(1973 Supp.) barred Plaintiffs-Appellants' action, and
the Lower Court granted Defendants-Respondents' motions.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents seek denial of Plaintiffs'
appeal and affirmance of the Order entered by the Lower
Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants Don M. Christensen, Don M. Christensen Construction Company and Construction Realty (hereinafter "Christensen") designed and
constructed a multi-car carport in 1965. Defendants Lewis
C. Hansen and Billie J. Hansen (hereinafter "Hansen")
were the parties in actual possession and control as owners
at the time the carport was designed and constructed. In
1969, Plaintiffs James E. Good and Mary G. Good acquired
an ownership interest in the carport. On January 1, 1973,
subsequent to a heavy snowfall, which caused extensive
damage throughout the area, the carport collapsed. This
action was not commenced until more than seven years
after the construction of the carport.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ARE BARRED FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION BY
SECTION 78-12-25.5 OF THE UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1973 SUPP.).
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Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Code Annotated (1973
Supp.) is specifically intended to cover the situation in
the instant case. The statute reads as follows:
"INJURY DUE T O DEFECTIVE DESIGN
OR CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENT T O
REAL PROPERTY — W I T H I N SEVEN YEARS.
— No action to recover damages for any injury
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to
the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death,
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition
of an improvement to real property, nor any action
for damages sustained on accotmt of such injury,
shall be brought against any person performing or
furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to
real property more than seven years after the completion of construction.
"(1) 'Person' shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or any other legal entity.
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall mean the date of issuance of
a certificate of substantial completion by the owner, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date
of the owner's use or possession of the improvement on real property.
"The limitation imposed by this provision
shall not apply to any person in actual possession
and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the
improvement at the time the defective and unsafe
condition of such improvement constitutes the
proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring an action.
"This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any
action." (Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25.5
(1973 Supp.) (Emphasis added)

3
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The preamble to this Act was adopted by the Legislature and explains the statute as follows:
"An Act Enacting a New Section 78-12-25.5
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Relating to the Limitations of Actions by Providing a Time Limit in
Which Actions for Injury to Property or Death
Must Be Brought Against Persons W h o Performed or Furnished the Design, Planning, Supervision
or Construction of Improvements on Real Property." (Laws of Utah, 1967, Chapter 218)
Section 78-12-25.5 is an expression of the legislative
policy decision that there should not be indefinite liability
in cases such as the instant one. This determination is
within the discretion of the Legislature. It determines that
if no cause of action arises within seven years from the date
of construction of an improvement to real property that
the expiration of that time period is prima facie evidence
that there was no faulty construction. This determination
is to give effect to the legislative policy decision to bar
litigation arising out of actions which occurred a longer
time prior to the institution of the litigation than the
number of years of the applicable statute of limitations.
Similar statutes are applicable in all areas of the law.
The legislative intent in enacting this statute was to avoid
spurious claims, to put a limit on the amount of time in
which a party can rely on construction defects without
taking into consideration the necessary subsequent maintenance of such property, and to avoid the obvious problems regarding the admission of evidence years after the
activity in question.
The Supreme Court said in the case of Price v.
70 Utah 156, 258 Pac. 1016 (1927):

Tuttle,

4
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"(1) In the construction of statutes it is the
duty of courts to ascertain the intent of the legislative body and, if the legislation is within the constitutional power of the Legislature, to enforce
that intent. In determining the intent of legislation not only the language of the act may be considered, but the purposes or objects sought by the
Legislature should be and are considered by the
courts in determining the legislative intent."
A case closely analogous to the instant case is Joseph
v. Burns, 260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203, (1971). In this
case, the owners and others brought an action against the
architects and engineers for damages resulting from a
collapsed roof. The Oregon limitations law provided that
no action could be brought more than ten years after the
"act or omission complained of." The Oregon Supreme
Court held that the ten-year statute of limitations applied
". . . . from the date of the act or omission regardless
of when the damage resulted or when the act or omission
was discovered."
The Washington Supreme Court reached a similar
decision in the case of Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co.
v. Central Heat & P. Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108,
(1972). In that decision, the Court discussed a similar
Washington statute involving actions arising out of defects in improvements to real property. The Court held
that real property improvement, namely, the re-installation of pipes, coils, hangers, and rods that replaced those
which had been a part of the cold storage warehouse building for forty years, was completed in 1961, but where the
suit against the contractor was not instituted until after
a portion of that cold storage system and equipment had
5
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collapsed in 1968, the suit was barred by the statute of
limitations because the cause of action did not accrue
within six years of the date of the completion of the work
by the contractor. The Court in Yakima pointed out that
since 1961 more than twenty states have enacted similar
statutes to actions arising out of defects in improvements
to real property. The Court also pointed out that in the
case of Skinner v. Anderson, 38 111. 2d 455, 231 N.E. 588,
(1967) (also cited by Plaintiffs) the Illinois Court declared the Illinois statute unconstitutional as being special
legislation in favor of only architects and contractors. The
Washington Court distinguished the statute cited in the
Yakima case from the statute in the Skinner case because
the scope of the Washington statute is not limited as to
vocation. The Utah statute is also not limited as to vocation. The Utah statute bars actions against any person
performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction, or construction of an improvement
to real property.
In the case of Salesian Society v. Formigli Corporation, 120 N J . Super. 493, 295 A.2d 19, (1972), in a suit
by a building owner more than thirteen years after construction against a contractor and sub-contractor where
the applicable statute limited the time period for bringing
such action to ten years, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that this statute was not a statute of limitations but
rather "the statute prevents from ever arising a cause of
action against members of the protected class at a given
point in time."

6
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By looking at the preamble and the body of the
statute together, we see that the obvious intent of the
Legislature was to place a seven-year statute of limitations
on the claims for anyone suffering injury or death by a
person who built, designed, planned, or supervised construction or improvement on real property. This statute
applies specifically to the conduct here in question. This,
as a specific statute versus the broad statute of any ". . .
action for relief not otherwise provided for by law, ,,
should take precedence over that broader statute where the
action comes within its provisions. Plaintiffs' argument
that this statute does not apply refers only to the fourth
paragraph. In that paragraph, by limiting this statute with
respect to owners and persons in actual possession or control of the property, the Legislature is saying that the person who is in possession or control at the time of the creation of the ''defective and unsafe condition" does not come
within these provisions. This is an exception made by the
Legislature based on the policy that the owner at the time
of the construction and the creation of the "defective and
unsafe condition" should be exempt from this seven-year
statute of limitations. The persons in actual possession
and control at the time of construction and completion of
construction were not Plaintiffs Good. Defendants
Hansen had possession at the time of construction.
Thus, if there was any defective and unsafe condition created, it was created during the possession and
ownership of Hansens.
In the case of Salesian Society vs. Formigli Corporation, supra, the New Jersey Court was required to interpret a clause in the New Jersey statute which is identical

7
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to the clause brought into question by the Plaintiff in the
instant case. After a lengthy discussion within which the
Court referred to Comment, "Limitation of Actions Statutes for Architects and Builders — Blueprints for Nonaction/' 18 Catholic U. L. Rev. 361, (1969), and Hearing
No. 7 on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678, and H.R. 11544 before
Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11, 24, 29,
(1967), the Court then went on to hold that "the legislative intent was to insulate contractors, architects, planners
and designers from all claims, whether in tort or in contract . . . ." What the Legislature intended to preserve
was the right to make a claim against a person "in actual
possession or control as owner, tenant or otherwise," at the
time of the creation of the defective condition.
The effect of this clause in this statute is that potential
liability for dangerous conditions is left on the owner or
other person in possession if an injury is caused by circumstances giving rise to a cause of action. The Legislature
meant to exclude from liability persons (such as Defendants herein) who have been long out of possession and
without the right or duty to make inspections and repairs for conditions that may be discovered within the
seven-year time period.
Since the Plaintiffs were not in possession, they were
cut off by the preceding parts of this statute. Any other
construction would lead to an almost total obliteration of
the statute. It would mean that only trespassers or strangers would have the law extended from the four-year statute of limitations to a seven-year statute. It is the function

8
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of the courts to give legal effect to the intent of the Legislature, not to thwart the obvious legislative intent. (See 50
Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 227; Parkinson v. State
Bank, 84 Utah 278, 35 P.2d 814, (1934), 94 ALR 112;
A. Booth & Co. v. Weigand, 30 Utah 135, 83 Pac. 734,
(1906); Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Mining Co., 69 Utah 4 1 ,
452 Pac. 276, (1926); Price v. Turtle, supra.
A statute identical to the Utah statute was upheld in
New Jersey in the case of Rosenberg v. North Bergen Tp.,
61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, (1972), in which the Court
held:
"The injured party has literally no cause of
action. The harm that has been done is damnum
absque injuria — a wrong for which the law affords no redress. The function of the statute is thus
rather to define substantive rights rather than to
alter or modify a remedy. A legislature is entirely
at liberty to enact new laws or abolish old ones as
long as no vested right is disturbed."
In that case that statute was attacked on exactly the
same grounds as Plaintiff is attacking this statute in the
instant case. That statute was upheld and Plaintiff was
denied his right of action in that statute.
Plaintiff relies on Deschamps v. Camp Dresser &
McKee, Inc., (N. Hamp.) 306 A.2d 771, (1973). That is
the only case Defendants have found supporting Plaintiffs, and since it does not give sufficient facts to determine
whether or not it is distinguishable from the instant case
and no authority or reasoning is therein cited to support
that Court's decision, Defendants find that case less than
persuasive.
9
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The Legislature intended that this statute govern this
particular type of action and therefore the Court should
affirm the Lower Court's decision that this statute does
govern the instant case.
POINT

II

EVEN IF THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE
T H A T THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS N O T
BARRED IN THE PROVISIONS OF 78-1225.5, THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AT SECTION 78-12-25 (2) IS AN
EFFECTIVE BAR T O PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs allege that Section 78-12-25 (2) which provides for a four-year statute of limitations is applicable
and that the four-year period runs from the time of the
discovery of the alleged defect or when with reasonable
diligence the alleged defect should have been discovered.
Plaintiffs allege that the carport in question was unlawfully designed and constructed because it failed to comply with local building code requirements. In the Plaintiffs' answer to Interrogatory No. 6, specific items are
alleged to have been structurally inadequate. Since Plaintiffs' cause of action is based upon structural defects, those
defects should have been obvious to Plaintiffs at the time
they took possession of the property. The construction
work complained of was open and obvious to anyone
looking at it. There was no concealment or hidden defect. Anyone in possession knew or should have known
of its defective condition at that time. Therefore, the
cause of action accrued at the time of completion of that
construction. In the case of State Tax Commission v. Span10
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, (1940), cited at page
14 of Plaintiffs' brief, the Court stated as follows:
"The question is then, when did the cause of
action accrue? The general rule is that it accrues
at the time it becomes remediable in the courts,
that is when the claim is in such condition that the
courts can receive and give judgment if the claim
is established/'
Assuming arguendo that the carport had been negligently constructed and unlawfully designed as alleged
by Plaintiffs, in that case, the alleged defects would have
been discoverable and therefore remediable at the time of
completion of the construction and the cause of action
would have accrued at that time.
In Poole v. Terminix, 200 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
Plaintiff had sought damages for breach of an implied
warranty by the Defendant to do a workmanlike job in
insulating Plaintiff's house against termites. In that case,
Plaintiff charged that in the course of the work the Defendant drilled holes in the cement floor of Plaintiff's
basement and then filled these holes with cement. Plaintiff alleged that the drilling damaged some tile drain beneath the floor, resulting in dampness in the basement,
but the alleged injury was not discovered until some time
later when leakage made the dampness visible. Defendant raised the three-year statute of limitations as a defense.
The suit had been filed more than three years after the
work was done but within three years from the time when
the alleged injury was discovered. Plaintiff contended
that the statute did not begin to run until such discovery
or by the exercise of ordinary diligence he would have
11
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discovered the breach. The Court held that for the statute
of limitations to begin at any time other than when a cause
of action arose that situation must be limited to one with
discovery prevented by fraud. The Court stated:
"No contention is made in the present case
upon the basis of fraud, either actual or constructive. Accordingly the general rule that limitations
begin to run from the time of breach, Zellan v.
Cole, 1950, 87 U.S. App. D.C. 9, 183 F.2d 139,
applies. This conforms with the purpose of statutes of limitation to bring repose and to bar efforts
to enforce stale claims as to which evidence might
be lost or destroyed. See Bailey v. Glover, 1874,
21 Wall. 342, 88 U.S. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636. In some
cases no doubt this rule leads to hardship, but the
rule for which plaintiff contends often would have
like consequences. W e must give effect to the
policy which bars litigation due to contract
breaches which occurred a longer time prior to
the institution of the litigation than the number of
years of the applicable statute of limitations. Even
in the criminal law, absent specific provision to the
contrary, a statute of limitations begins to run from
the time of commission rather than of exposure of
the alleged offense. See Synnott v. State, 1927, 38
Okl. Cr. 281, 260 P. 517."
It would appear that even if the limitation imposed
by this provision does not apply to the Plaintiffs in this
case, thus bringing the four-year statute into play, the
terms and definitions with regard to actions of this kind
for injuries caused by defective design or construction of
improvement to real property are the statements of intention of the Legislature and would therefore still be
applicable. Thus, even if Plaintiff wishes to remove himself from the seven-year limitation, he cannot change the
12
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circumstances under which he brings this action nor remove himself from the Legislature's determination of
when the cause of action would accrue; namely, the completion of construction as defined in Section 78-12-25.5(2)
which would be controlling under Section 78-12-1 of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Appellants' actions are barred by Section 78-12-25(2)
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
POINT III
SECTION 78-12-25.5 OF THE UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED IS A VALID A N D CONSTITUTIONAL EXPRESSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY DECISION T H A T THERE
SHOULD N O T BE LIABILITY FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD IN A CASE OF ALLEGED
DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION.
Such a determination is within the discretion of the
Legislature. It has been determined, in the case of this
statute, that if no cause of action arises within seven years
of the date of construction then that is prima facie evidence that there was no faulty construction.
Plaintiff asserts that this statute violates the Constitution because it may extinguish a cause of action before
that cause of action arises.
This is not a violation of due process or equal protection. The Constitution does not guarantee a right to
sue but only a right to due process and equal protection.
This statute does not violate those standards because it
is not discriminatory. It applies evenly to all injuries
13
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which fall within its area of coverage. People who have
such injuries are not in any suspect classification, and they
are therefore not deprived of due process or equal protection.
Plaintiff relies upon Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah
31, 151 Pac. 366, (1915), to show that 78-12-25.5 is unconstitutional. Brown does not support Plaintiff's position but, rather, recognizes the legislative right to place
limitations on the right to be heard in court. It specifically
states that where the statute does not give a remedy the
Constitution does not require one.
"The right and power as well as the duty, of
creating rights and to provide remedies, lies with
the legislature and not with the courts. The courts
can only protect existing rights, and they may do
that only in accordance with established and known
remedies."
In many cases our statutes not only extinguish a cause
of action before the cause of action arises but they also
completely cut off the cause of action. For example, Workman's Compensation cases under Section 35-1-60 cut off
all civil liability of employers to employees under the
Workman's Compensation Statutes. See Masich v. United
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., et al., 113 Utah
101, 191 P.2d 612, (1948), where the Utah Supreme Court
held that the employee's right to sue was entirely abrogated by the statutory provisions.
Defendants urge the Court to take note of the United
States Supreme Court decision, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
451, 1 L.Ed. 2d 1485, 77 Sup. Ct. 1344, (1957), where
14
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Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in dissent, caution against
the invalidation of legislation in the absence of extreme
circumstances. They state:
"Invalidating legislation is serious business
and it ought not to be indulged in. . . . In applying the Equal Protection Clause, we must be fastidiously careful to observe the admonition of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice
Cardozo that we do not sit as a super legislature.
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 80 L.Ed. 299, 317,
56 S.Ct. 252, 102 ALR 54 (1935)."
This statute is a valid exercise of legislative discretion within the constitutional limitations upon the legislative powers. It is not unconstitutional.
The Utah Supreme Court has often held that the
legislative body has great discretion in fixing limits on
classification and also that it is not within the judiciary's
province to question the Legislature's wisdom or motives
in enactment of a statute. See: Davis v. Ogden City, 117
Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, (1950), 16 ALR 2d 1208, rehearing denied, 118 Utah 401, 223 P.2d 412; Slater v. Salt
Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, (1949); Thomas v.
Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477,
(1948), appeal denied 69 S. Ct. 739, 336 U.S. 950, 93 L.Ed.
1090; Rowley v. Public Service Commission, 112 Utah
116, 185 P.2d 514, (1947); Bateman v. Board of Examiners of State of Utah, 1 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381, (1958);
Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939, (1943);
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, UCA 1953, 10-3-1; and
Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643,
(1972).
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POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION BECAUSE IN FAILING
TO ALLEGE A DUTY OWED BY DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFFS THEY HAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED.
In the pleadings now before this Court, Plaintiffs
have not made any allegation of any duty, contractual,
statutory or otherwise owed by Christensen and Hansen
to Plaintiffs Good. In the case of Industrial Commission
of Utah v. Wasatch Grading Co., 14 P.2d 988, 80 Utah
223, (1932), the Court held that the complaint was insufficient because it failed to disclose the essentials of
the alleged duty between the parties therein. In the instant case, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a duty owed by
Defendants to Plaintiffs and therefore they are barred
from bringing this action.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs are barred from bringing this action against
Defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
Dean E. Conder
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN
A N D HENRIOD
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents Don M. Christensen,
Don M. Christensen Construction
Co., and Construction Realty
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Guy Burningham
GUSTIN & GUSTIN
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents Lewis C. Hansen
and Billie J. Hansen
1610 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that this Brief of Respondents was
served by mailing two (2) copies thereof, postage prepaid,
to Tim Dalton Dunn, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants,
702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 this
day of July, 1974.
Dean E. Conder
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